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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
KENNY LEE DOPORTO, : Case No. 20040925-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (j) (2002). Appellant/Defendant Kenny Lee Doporto was 
convicted after a jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony and Use or 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. The Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge, presided over the trial. A copy of the judgment is attached as 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION 
Issue. Whether there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to sustain a 
conviction for aggravated robbery where the State failed to prove that Mr. Doporto 
intended to use his vehicle as a dangerous weapon in the course of committing a 
robbery? 
Standard of Review. This Court will reverse a jury verdict "when, after viewing 
the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, 
[it] find[s] that 'the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.'" State v. 
Rudolph. 2000 UT App 155, |22, 3 P.3d 192 (quoting State v. Heaps . 2000 UT 5, lfl9, 
999 P.2d 565 (citation omitted)). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 143:97, 112-113. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
§ 76-1-601 DEFINITIONS 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the 
victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury; or (ii) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an 
item. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5) (2003). 
§ 76-6-301 ROBBERY 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal 
property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force 
against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in 
an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after 
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the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (2003). 
§ 76-6-302 AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
6 0 1 ; . . . 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be ffin the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission 
of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 3, 2004, the State charged Mr. Doporto by Information with aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003); theft by 
deception, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405; unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37a-5 (2002); and driving on a denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked license, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (2002). R. 1-4; 7-11, 
14-17. On July 20, 2004, the State amended the Information removing the charge of 
driving on a denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked license and reduced the theft by 
deception charge to a class B misdemeanor. R. 53-54; 143:4, 5. On July 20, 2004, a 
jury trial was held. R. 143. At the end of the State's case, it made a motion to dismiss 
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the theft by deception charge. R. 143:97. The jury convicted Mr. Doporto of the 
remaining charges, aggravated robbery and possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 
143:127. 
On September 24, 2004, the trial court sentenced Mr. Doporto to an indeterminate 
term of not less than five years and which may be for life on the aggravated robbery 
conviction and a term of six months on the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction. 
R. 117, 144:5-6. The counts were ordered to run concurrently with each other but 
consecutively to the other terms he was presently serving. R. 117, 144:5-6. On October 
13, 2004, Mr. Doporto filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 119. Mr. Doporto is currently 
incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The evidence presented at trial reflected the following: On the morning of 
February 27, 2004, Mr. Doporto was on the telephone trying to borrow money because 
he was beginning to get sick from his addiction to heroin. R. 143:98. When Mr. 
Doporto was unsuccessful at acquiring drugs early that morning, he drove around and 
looked for something he could steal to buy heroin. R. 143:100. Dylan Cole, drove his 
truck to his father's, Eric Cole's, business Underfoot Floors, on 300 West and 1900 
South in Salt Lake City. R. 143:45-46. While driving on 300 West Mr. Doporto saw 
Dylan's truck pull in front of him and he followed it to the business. R. 143:101. Dylan 
left his truck open while he loaded electric saws, compressors and various tools from the 
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business showroom into his truck. R. 143:46-47. Eric Cole (Mr. Cole), Dylan's father, 
and his wife were also at the showroom. R. 143:51-53. When Mr. Doporto saw that no 
one was in the parking lot at Underfoot Floors, he pulled in and parked his vehicle facing 
the street, leaving the engine running. R. 143:57, 59, 101, 102. Mr. Doporto saw all the 
tools sitting in the truck but only took the compressor. R. 143:102. 
As Mr. Cole was sitting at his computer by the window, he noticed a vehicle drive 
up with a person in it he did not recognize. R. 143:53. Mr. Cole continued working 
briefly and then got up and looked out a small window into the parking lot. R. 143:54. 
Mr. Cole testified that he saw Mr. Doporto reach into the back of his son's truck and take 
a compressor and walk to his vehicle. R. 143:54, 58. Mr. Doporto got back into his 
vehicle and put the compressor on the seat next to him but then thought he should put it 
down where no one would be able to see it. R. 143:103. Mr. Cole ran out of the 
showroom around to where Mr. Doporto was parked. R. 143:54, 59. Mr. Cole went to 
the front of Mr. Doporto's vehicle with his hands up and yelled, "Hey, stop, wait a 
minute." R. 143:54, 60. Mr. Cole estimated that he was within a couple inches from the 
bumper. R. 143:55, 103. Mr. Cole testified that Mr. Doporto did not see him coming, 
and when Mr. Doporto looked up, he appeared shocked that Mr. Cole was standing there. 
R. 143:55, 60. Mr. Doporto also testified that he was shocked and scared at seeing Mr. 
Cole in front of his vehicle. R. 143:103. 
Mr. Cole testified that he believed Mr. Doporto panicked and began to accelerate 
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the vehicle, which was already running. R. 143:55, 59. Upon seeing Mr. Cole, Mr. 
Doporto panicked and his only thought was to get out of there. R. 143:103. Mr. 
Doporto thought Mr. Cole would get out of the way if he knew that Mr. Doporto was 
going to leave. R. 143:103. As Mr. Doporto began to accelerate, Mr. Cole jumped onto 
the hood of the vehicle out of instinct and to avoid being run over. R. 143:55-56, 61. 
Mr. Cole held onto the hood of the vehicle as Mr. Doporto accelerated maybe 50 feet out 
of the parking lot and turned south onto 300 West. R. 143:56. Mr. Doporto testified that 
he went and stopped several times in the hopes that Mr. Cole would either fall or jump 
off the vehicle, however, Mr. Cole continued to hold on. R. 143:104. Mr. Doporto then 
did a quick U-tum in an effort to get Mr. Cole off of the vehicle. R. 143:56, 61. Mr. 
Cole rolled off the vehicle into the street, receiving minor injuries consisting mainly of 
scrapes to his arms. R. 143:56, 61, 67. Mr. Doporto testified that he never intended to 
hurt Mr. Cole. R. 143:104, 107. Mr. Doporto's vehicle went onto the curb across the 
street from the showroom and stalled. R. 143:62. Mr. Cole got up and ran towards the 
vehicle but Mr. Doporto was able to get the vehicle started and drive off, heading north. 
R. 143:62,66,75,105. 
Jason Cofran (Mr. Cofran) testified that he drove by during the incident. R. 
143:71. Mr. Cofran testified that he saw two men darting for a vehicle like they were 
racing to get to the vehicle which "looked like child's play.11 R. 143:72. One of the 
individuals got in the vehicle and the other pounded on the window. R. 143:72. The 
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vehicle started to take off, and the other individual ran in front of the vehicle and the 
vehicle stopped. R. 143:72. According to Mr. Cofran, the vehicle moved toward the 
individual again then stopped. R. 143:73. The individual in front of the vehicle hopped 
on the hood and banged on the windshield, before the vehicle took off into oncoming 
traffic heading northbound. R. 143:72-74. The individual driving the vehicle hit the 
brakes and did a 180-degree turn, continuing to go northbound, and the person fell off 
the hood. R. 143:74-75. Mr. Cofran called 911 and followed the vehicle to 39 th South 
and State. R. 143:76. Mr. Cofran lost the vehicle for awhile but spotted Mr. Doporto 
coming out of a pawn shop and getting into his vehicle. R. 143:76, 106. Mr. Cofran 
followed Mr. Doporto to another pawn shop, Sportsman Pawn, where Mr. Doporto went 
inside and pawned the compressor for $30. R. 143:77, 106-07. Mr. Cofran waited at 
Sportsman Pawn until the police showed up. R. 143:77. 
Officer Bench, Salt Lake Police Department, responded to the hit and run 
complaint at Sportsman Pawn. R. 143:84. Officer Bench located Mr. Doporto inside the 
pawn shop. R. 143:85. Officer Bench took Mr. Doporto into custody and conducted a 
search. R. 143:86. The search of Mr. Doporto's person revealed a syringe and a spoon. 
R. 143:86, 90. Mr. Doporto did not have any object on him or in his vehicle that could 
be used as a weapon. R. 143:88. Officer Herburg, Salt Lake City Police Department, 
also arrived at the pawn shop. R. 143:90. Officer Herburg testified that Mr. Doporto 
was very cooperative. R. 143:93. Officer Herburg conducted an interview with Mr. 
7 
Doporto after giving him his Miranda warnings. R. 143:91 -92. Officer Herburg asked 
Mr. Doporto if the vehicle he was driving was the one he used to take the compressor. 
R. 143:92, 95. Officer Herburg testified that Mr. Doporto said "yes." R. 143:92, 95. 
Officer Herburg asked Mr. Doporto about the incident with Mr. Cole being on the hood 
of his vehicle. R. 143:92. Officer Herburg testified that Mr. Doporto told her he was a 
heroin addict and he was concerned about being caught and he needed his fix. R. 
143:92. Mr. Doporto told Officer Herburg that he was just trying to get away. R. 
143:95. Officer Herburg testified that Mr. Doporto told her he was embarrassed by his 
actions and that the heroin makes him do what he does. R. 143:95. 
The State charged Mr. Doporto with aggravated robbery, alleging that in the 
course of committing a robbery he used his vehicle as a dangerous weapon. R. 1-4,7-11, 
14-17, 143:117. Mr. Doporto acknowledged that vehicles can seriously injure and cause 
death of individuals who are hit by them. R. 143:108. Mr. Doporto testified that he was 
not aware at the moment the danger of Mr. Cole standing in front of his vehicle. R. 
143:109. Mr. Doporto testified he intended only to get Mr. Cole off the front of his 
vehicle and get away. R. 143:109. 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Mr. Doporto guilty of aggravated 
robbery and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 112-13,143:127. Mr. 
Doporto timely appealed. R. 119. Mr. Doporto is currently incarcerated. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For the offense of aggravated robbery, it was necessary for the State to prove 
that Mr. Doporto intended to use his vehicle as a dangerous weapon. In this case, the 
evidence was insufficient to show that Mr. Doporto had the requisite intent to use his 
vehicle as a dangerous weapon. Therefore, the State failed to prove an element of the 
offense. The conviction must be vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THAT 
APPELLANT INTENDED TO USE HIS VEHICLE AS A DANGEROUS 
WEAPON. 
The State failed to present sufficient evidence to support that Mr. Doporto 
intended to use his vehicle as a dangerous weapon to sustain a conviction for aggravated 
robbery. The evidence that was presented by the State, even when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that Mr. Doporto committed 
the crime of which he stands convicted. State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) 
(citation omitted). 
"We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a 
matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." 
State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. 
Harman. 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The defendant must 
overcome a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for 
a jury verdict. See id.; State v. Vessev, 967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). "We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury 
verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and "will reverse 
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only if the evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime.'" Smith, 927 P.2d at 651 (quoting Harman, 
767 P.2d at 568 (quoting State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983))). 
However, though the burden is high, it is not impossible. See id. "We will 
not make speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence." IcL. (internal 
quotations and alterations omitted). "Every element of the crime charged 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Harman, 767 P.2d at 568. 
"To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State has introduced 
evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." Smith. 
927P.2dat651. 
State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^ 10, 2 P.3d 954; see also State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, Tfl8, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Leleae. 1999 UT App 368,1fl7, 993 P.2d 232. 
To succeed on a claim of insufficient evidence, the defendant "'must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, }^13, 
25 P.3d 985 (quoting State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ^ 14, 989 P.2d 1065 (citation 
omitted)). 
In the event the evidence presented at trial is contradictory or conflicting, so long 
as a reasonable interpretation of that evidence supports each element of the offense, the 
Court will not disturb the jury's verdict. See Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ^[14. 
[W]e do not sit as a second trier of fact: "'It is the exclusive function of the 
jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses.' So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime 
can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." 
Id at TJ16 (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. 
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Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980))); see also State v. Cravens. 2000 UT App 344, 
^|18, 15 P.3d 635 ("4it is the province of the trier of fact to determine which testimony to 
believe and what inferences to draw from the facts'" (citation omitted)); State v. Chanev. 
1999 UT App 309, ^ [30, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may not weigh evidence or assess witness 
credibility, but instead 'assume that the jury believed the evidence and inferences that 
support the verdict'" (citation omitted)); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991) 
(the mere existence of conflicting evidence does not warrant reversal). 
Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this Court 
still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict. The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the 
reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But 
this does not mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a 
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
State v. Shumwav. 2002 UT 124, TJ15, 63 P.3d 94 (quoting Petree. 659 P.2d at 444-45). 
Therefore, if the verdict "is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote 
or speculative possibilities of guilt," the charge must be dismissed. State v. Brown. 948 
P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997); see also State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, ^5, 988 
P.2d 452 (reversal is required if the state has failed to establish an element of the offense 
with direct evidence or reasonable inferences). With that in mind, the function of a 
reviewing court is to ensure "that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each 
element of the charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
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defendant committed the crime.'1 State v. Merila, 966 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (quoting James. 819 P.2d at 784). 
As set forth below, in this matter the state failed to present evidence sufficient to 
establish that Mr. Doporto intended to use his vehicle as a dangerous weapon. The 
conviction, therefore, must be dismissed. 
A. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY REQUIRES THE STATE TO PROOF THAT 
APPELLANT INTENDED TO USE HIS VEHICLE AS A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON. 
To establish aggravated robbery, the state was required to prove that Mr. Doporto, 
"in the course of committing robbery . . . use[d] or threatened] to use a dangerous 
weapon . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003). In order to sustain a conviction for 
aggravated robbery, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. 
Doporto possessed the requisite mental state to commit the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-501 (2)(b). The mental state required for aggravated robbery is indicated by the 
inclusion of the word "use[d] or threatened] to use." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. The 
terms fluse[d] or threatened to use" denotes that a defendant must possess an intent to 
employ an item as a dangerous weapon. This is especially true when the item the State 
charges as the dangerous weapon is not typically or obviously thought of as a dangerous 
weapon and is not used for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. 
"'When interpreting a statute, this [C]ourt looks first to the statute's plain 
language to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose [reading] the plain language 
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of the statute as a whole '" State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sundance Dev. Corp.. 
2003 UT App 367,14,485 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (citations omitted). The Court's purpose 
when interpreting statutory language is "'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and 
meaningful,' and . . . presume the legislature use[d] each term advisedly and . . . 
according to its ordinary meaning." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^52, 63 P.3d 621 
(alterations in original) (citations omitted). In doing so, the court seeks to "'avoid 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.'" IdL 
(citations omitted). 
Webster's defines "use" as "to put into action or service . . . avail oneself of . . . to 
carry out a purpose or action by means of. . . to behave toward . . . act with regard to . . . " 
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Webster's) 1297 (10th ed. 2002). Black's Law 
Dictionary defines "use" as "[t]he application or employment of something . . . a long-
continued possession and employment of a thing for the purpose for which it is adapted . 
.." Black's Law Dictionary 1249 (Abridged 7 th ed. 2000). These definitions illustrate 
that the meaning of the term "use" requires a conscious intent to "act with" or "employ" 
an item. The legislature made intent an essential element of the offense by choosing to 
include the term "use" within the aggravated robbery statute rather than simply 
employing language making mere possession or having control of a deadly weapon 
enough. 
In this case, the State failed to produce sufficient evidence that Mr. Doporto 
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intended to use his vehicle as a dangerous weapon. In fact, the evidence supports that 
Mr. Doporto was simply using his vehicle as a means of escape and had no intent to use 
his vehicle as a dangerous weapon. Therefore, the State failed to prove every element of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1), (2b) (2003). 
Therefore, the conviction for aggravated robbery must be reversed. 
B. THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THAT MR. 
DOPORTO HAD THE INTENT TO COMMIT AGGRAVATED ROBBERY . 
The defense made a motion to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge on the 
ground that the State failed to establish that Mr. Doporto intended to use his vehicle as a 
dangerous weapon. R. 143:112-13. The trial court denied the motion. R. 143:113. 
The marshaled evidence is as follows: On the morning of February 27, 2004, Mr. 
Doporto was suffering physically from his addiction to heroin. R. 143:98. Mr. Doporto 
unsuccessfully tried to obtain drugs that morning. R. 143:100. Mr. Doporto drove 
around and looked for something he could steal so that he could buy drugs. R. 143:100. 
While driving on 300 West, Dylan Cole's truck pulled in front of him and he followed it 
to the business Underfoot Floors. R. 143:101. Dylan left his truck open while he loaded 
various tools into it from the business' showroom. R. 143:46-47. When no one was in 
the parking lot, Mr. Doporto pulled into the parking lot and parked his vehicle facing the 
street, leaving the engine running. R. 143:57, 59, 101, 102. Several tools were in the 
truck but Mr. Doporto only took the compressor. R. 143:101-02. 
Mr. Cole noticed Mr. Doporto drive into the parking lot. R. 143:53. Mr. Cole got 
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up from his computer and looked out a small window into the parking lot. R. 143:54. 
Mr. Cole watched as Mr. Doporto took the compressor out of Dylan's truck. R. 143:54, 
58. Mr. Cole ran out of the showroom around to where Mr. Doporto was parked and 
stood in front of Mr. Doporto ?s vehicle with his hands up and yelled, "Hey, stop, wait a 
minute.1' R. 143:54, 59-60. Mr. Cole was within a couple inches of the bumper of Mr. 
Doporto's vehicle. R. 143:55, 103. Mr. Doporto did not see Mr. Cole coming, and when 
he looked up from inside his vehicle he was shocked that Mr. Cole was standing there. 
R. 143:55,60, 103. 
Mr. Doporto panicked and began to accelerate the vehicle which was already in 
gear. R. 143:55, 59, 102-03. When Mr. Doporto panicked his only thought was to get 
out of there. R. 143:103. Mr. Doporto thought Mr. Cole would get out of the way if he 
know that Mr. Doporto was going to leave. R. 143:103. As the vehicle progressed those 
few inches toward Mr. Cole, Mr. Cole jumped onto the hood of the vehicle out of 
instinct and to avoid being run over. R. 143:55-56, 61. Mr. Cole held onto the hood of 
the vehicle as Mr. Doporto continued maybe 50 feet out of the parking lot. R. 143:56. 
Mr. Cole continued to hold on until Mr. Doporto made a quick U-turn in an effort to get 
him off of the vehicle. R. 143:56, 61, 104. Mr. Cole rolled off the vehicle into the street 
and received minor injuries consisting mainly of scrapes to his arms. R. 143:56, 61, 67. 
Mr. Cole got up and ran towards the vehicle, but Mr. Doporto started his stalled vehicle 
and drove off. R. 143:62, 66, 75, 105. 
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The marshaled evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, 
failed to show that Mr. Doporto had the intent necessary to use his vehicle as a dangerous 
weapon. The fact that a vehicle can be a dangerous weapon is not enough to sustain a 
aggravated robbery conviction. The marshaled evidence supports that Mr. Doporto did 
not intend to use his car as a dangerous weapon and never intended to hurt Mr. Cole. R. 
143:104, 107. Mr. Cole testified that when Mr. Doporto looked up and saw him 
standing there, he was shocked. R. 143:55, 60, 103. Mr. Cole further testified that he 
believed that Mr. Doporto just panicked when he saw him and accelerated. R. 143:55. 
Mr. Doporto did not realize at that moment, while in shock and panicked, the danger of 
Mr. Cole standing in front of his vehicle. R. 143:109. Rather than showing that Mr. 
Doporto had formed an intent to use his vehicle as a dangerous weapon, the evidence 
showed that Mr. Doporto was in a state of shock and only intended to get Mr. Cole off 
the front of his vehicle and get away. R. 143:109. The fact of Mr. Doporto state of 
shock and panic is further evidenced by Mr. Cole's victim impact statement where he 
states that he does not "believe Mr. Doporto meant to harm [him] nor was the use of his 
car intended to harm [him]. He panic[k]ed, I believe, but there was no intent/' See R. 
115; Addendum B. Under the law, the evidence is insufficient to show that Mr. Doporto 
intended to use his vehicle as a dangerous weapon. Because the State failed to prove 
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Doporto's conviction for 
aggravated robbery must be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Doporto respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
his convictions for aggravated robbery. 
SUBMITTED this I***- day of January, 2005. 
/fX-
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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State, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to 
the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th 
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this tx^day of January, 
2005. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 




3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





Prosecutor: CAMERON, ANNE A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): O'CONNELL, JOHN D JR 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 28, 1965 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:51-9:59 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/21/2004 Guilty 
3. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/21/2004 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041901478 FS 
Judge: J DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: Seotember 24, 2004 
Page 1 
Case No: 041901478 
Date: Sep 24, 2004 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Counts to run concurrently, but sentence to run consecutive to 
other terms presently serving. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to 
a term of 6 month(s) 
A 
Dated this day of 
Paqe 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
' l e L ^ K U W E 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT AUG - 3 2004 
u 
Please fill out this form and RETURN IMMEDIATELY. The Victim Impact Statement-4as^ 
developed to benefit victims of crime and to bring the court's attention the concerns of the victim 
regarding sentencing of the defendant. This is your opportunity to let the court know how this crime 
has affected you and your family. The District Attorneys Office will present this form to the 
sentencing judge. 
At the time set for sentencing of the defendant, the judge will make various decisions regarding 
sentencing alternatives, including incarceration, probation, fines, community service, restitution, etc. 
The Victim Impact Statement is only one of the factors the court considers in imposing a sentence. 
The District Attorneys Office will make every effort possible to represent your needs. Thank you. 
Name. eru <rVtL 
Name: 










Sentencing Date: 09/24/2004 
Judge: J D Frederick 
Attorney: Anne A Cameron 
N O T E : Please be advised that the information contained in the Victim Impact Statement (including bills or receipts 
containing your address or telephone number), by Court Order, may be viewed by the defendant either at the time of 
sentencing, or at any subsequent review of sentence. Feel free to delete your address and phone number from the 
documents you submit 
1. Brief description of crime in which you were involved ^rwflM^j^ 
YW> 
2. As a result of this crime, were you physically injured? 
3a. Did you need medical treatment for these injuries? I/^^J ////tfflv 
3b. If this case involved sexual abuse, do you request that the defendant 
be tested for HIV? 
4. Were you emotionally injured as a result of this crime? 
5. Have you received any counseling or therapy as a result of this crime? 
6. Has this crime affected your ability to earn a living? 
7. Has this crime in any way affected your lifestyle or your family's lifestyle? 
8. Are there any other effects of this crime which are now being experienced 
by you or your family? 
Yes No J 
Yes^No 
Yes No ^ 
Yes No jS 
Yes No '^ 
Yes No *^ 
Yes No ^ 
Yes No ^ 
Page 1 of2 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT 
Amount of expenses incurred to date as a result of medical treatment received: $_ 
(enclose copies of all bills you have received). 
Anticipated expenses: (enclose doctor's statement). $ ~&^ 
Amount of expenses incurred to date as a result of counseling or therapy: $ ^ ^ 
(enclose copies of all bills you have received). 
9. Loss of wages to date:
 ; . , / . * $ 
Anticipated loss of wages: /rf'?Y/4 7/f/\£ &f (p?i r/* ^/rf^/* $ ~2>#Q>0& 
Does your employer pay wages when you are in court? &f//f/?^ffiy?fy/ Yes No 
What are your hourly wages? $ 
Please enclose a letter from your employer if you have lost wages or benefits. 
10. Did you suffer any monetary loss or property damage as a result of this crime? Yes No ** 
If yes, please state amount. $ 
11. Did insurance cover any of the expenses you have had as a result of this crime? Yes No ^ 
If yes, please specify the amount and type of insurance coverage, 
and attach a statement from your insurance. 
IF YOU WISH TO EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, 
PLEASE DO SO ON A SEPARATE SHEET OF 8-1/2" x 11" PAPER. 
14. How do you feel about the outcome of this case? 2 ok/? '/ &//?(/*- rtf ' fojffQfA* 
/Hfifpr $ h ^ /??* W t<4& Mt Mas, */ A^ 'ster , , 
-/Mn/t Mrt* rtp /#$&/' - - -
15. Even though sentencing is determined by law (depending upon the particular crime), the court 
choices within legal guidelines to impose sentence. Accordingly, your suggestions and 
recommendations regarding sentencing are important. Please state what punishments you believe 
the defendant should receive. ., / , , / / / / • 
tfr'W ti jfo/ /WMJjf ,Afc tf/ttt& r/w* srfaA 4nff 
WWfrM? mf- Me/ ftfW- -y 
Date Signature 
Please mail this form to the office of the District Attorney of Salt Lake County, Witness Assistance 
Unit, 111 East Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City UT 84111. 
If for any reason, you do not wish to fill out this form, please check here , date and sign above, and 
return this form to the above address. 
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